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TAB "A"

G-2 Contribution to NIE-29/2:

"PROBABILITY OF AN ATTACK ON YUGOSLAVIA IN 1951"

I. WHAT INDICATIONS, POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE OF A POSSIBLE ATTACK ON YUGOSLAVIA BY THE U.S.S.R. AND/OR THE SATELLITES HAVE BEEN NOTED SINCE 4 MAY 1951 (date of NIE-29/1)?

1. Specific positive indications include: a. Increasing emphasis on defense measures throughout the Satellites. These measures include: air defense, instruction given to Bulgarian civilians by local military personnel in the Yambol area; repairs and extension of wartime air raid shelters in Budapest; antiaircraft weapons installations noted in all Satellites except Albania.

b. Continued psychological preparation of Soviet and Satellite people for the possibility of war, particularly against Yugoslavia.

c. Provocation of tension between Yugoslavia and her neighboring Satellites by means of increasing the number and intensity of border incidents. One possible objective of such border incidents is the infiltration of agents into Yugoslavia.

d. Propagandistic threats against Tito and his regime by high ranking Soviet personalities, such as, Molotov in his Liberation Day address at Warsaw, in his Liberation Day address at Bucharest, and in his Army Day address in Sofia.

e. Further tightening of security in the Satellites adjacent to Yugoslavia by evacuation of unreliaables from border areas in Hungary and Rumania and increased border security measures in Bulgaria.

f. Increases in the strength and quality of the armed forces particularly in Bulgaria and Hungary, by means of call-ups including some reservist specialists without evidence that releases are planned or underway.

g. Major air field improvements reportedly underway at 17 locations in the Satellites, including two in Hungary, three in Rumania, and three in Bulgaria.

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h. Continued progress in the modernization of the Satellite Air Forces to include YAK-15 jets in the Rumanian Air Force, the probable assignment of MIG-15's to the Hungarian Air Force and the continued training of the Czech Air Force in MIG-15's.

i. Reported construction and rehabilitation of hospital trains in Hungary.

j. Reported preparation in Hungary, of planes with Yugoslav markings for use in provoking an incident with Yugoslavia, or for maneuver purposes.

2. Specific negative indications include:

a. Lack of evidence of urgency in Soviet-Satellite military preparation.

b. Continued progress in Soviet Satellite "peace campaigns" which ostensibly is inconsistent with any contemplated imminent military action against Yugoslavia.

c. The Soviets apparent efforts to continue pressures other than direct military action against Yugoslavia.

3. Despite the above positive indications, there is no firm evidence that a Soviet or Satellite attack against Yugoslavia will occur prior to mid-1952. The overriding deterring factor may be the virtual certainty that such an attack would initiate a general war. Yugoslav ties with the West have advanced to the stage that the Soviets probably now consider that such an attack must be included in their plans for over-all global hostilities.

II. WHAT CHANGES HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN SOVIET/SATELLITE CAPABILITIES FOR AN ATTACK ON YUGOSLAVIA?

A. Development of the East European Satellite Armies has continued at a steady rate since May 1951. The reorganization, re-equipment and increased strengths, with a resultant increase of Satellite capabilities, suggests preparations for eventual hostilities. Since May 1951, estimates

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of the Army strengths of the individual Satellites bordering upon Yugoslavia have increased as follows:

	4 May 1951	Present	Increase
Albania	45,000	45,000	--
Bulgaria	145,000	165,000	20,000
Hungary	65,000	100,000	35,000
Rumania	<u>205,000</u>	<u>230,000</u>	<u>25,000</u>
	<u>460,000</u>	<u>540,000</u>	<u>80,000</u>

1. Part of these strength increases has been used to form new divisions while part has been used to bring existing units closer to their Table of Organization strengths. Since May 1951, four new divisions have been identified in the Satellite armies listed above.

2. Many of the previously existing divisions have been reorganized into Soviet-type mechanized, tank, or rifle divisions and new or re-organized supporting brigades, regiments, and battalions have been identified.

3. Soviet efforts to increase and Sovietize the military power of the East European Satellites follows a clearly defined pattern, although the rapidity of development varies in each country. The first phase of such development consists of reorganization of the army along Soviet lines. This initial phase is never undertaken in any Satellite until its governmental agencies, particularly its Armed Forces have been cleansed of all personalities having nationalist and anti-Communist tendencies. This is followed by the reequipping of the Armed Forces with Soviet materiel, meanwhile new cadres are formed for expansion purposes. Finally there is a wholesale purge of the lower command levels, and simultaneously new classes of conscripts are called up to fill out the divisions formed from the cadres.

4. Assuming that the present rate of development will continue under existing conditions, it is estimated that the East European Satellite Armies, except Albania, could reach their optimum by the end of 1953.

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5. The Satellite military programs appear designed for aggressive purposes either in preparation for a limited offensive against Yugoslavia (possibly against Greece or European Turkey) or for active participation with Soviet forces in an offensive in Europe. Except in the case of Bulgaria, the current rate of development in the East European Armies does not indicate readiness for hostilities before early in 1953. However, Satellite capabilities for initiating an attack on Yugoslavia with little or no warning have further increased, and Satellite military preparations are continuing.

6. Provocations by the Satellites along the Yugoslav border continue and, when coupled with the current Satellites capabilities, warrant the conclusion that an attack on Yugoslavia late in 1951 or in the first six months of 1952 due to "miscalculation" inherent in the continuation of such border incidents should be considered a serious possibility.

B. The Satellite Armies have been developed to the point where they now have the capability of jointly undertaking limited offensive operations without the assistance of Soviet tactical forces, although sustained combat would require Soviet logistical support.

1. The Satellite Armies would undoubtedly be indoctrinated by vigorous Communist propaganda that they are fighting a just war either to repel an alleged invasion by Yugoslavia, or by the West. This indoctrination, coupled with firm discipline within the Satellite Armies maintained by effective security forces, would insure that the Satellite troops would fight well in joint operations so long as they were substantially successful in the war.

2. Most of the experienced combat leaders within the Armies of the East European Satellites have been purged since VE-day. Replacements for the purged officers have been selected primarily on the basis of political reliability. Nevertheless, substantial numbers of officers

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from these countries have had combat experience and have received training either in military schools in the U.S.S.R., by actually serving in Soviet Army units, or under Soviet military missions in their home countries following VE day. Although information to date neither indicates that joint Satellite training has been conducted nor that a Central Command has been established for the Satellite forces, Soviet "advisers" would probably provide the nucleus for such a Central Command. Soviet "advisers" attached to tactical units would counterbalance the current deficiencies in experienced leadership and probably would function as de facto commanders of major units in the field.

C. There has been no significant build-up of Soviet forces in countries adjacent to Yugoslavia.

III. WHAT CHANGES HAVE OCCURRED IN YUGOSLAVIA'S CAPABILITIES TO RESIST A SOVIET/SATELLITE ATTACK?

A. The Yugoslav armed forces are presently equipped with a heterogeneous supply of arms and equipment, with Soviet and German models predominating. The supply of Western military aid to date has consisted of light equipment in quantities insufficient to enhance materially their present capabilities. Yugoslavia's present supply of small arms and equipment is believed sufficient to equip her present troops. She is lacking in spare parts and large caliber weapons, particularly antitank, antiaircraft artillery and armor. Such equipment has not as yet been supplied.

B. Following recent technical discussions in Washington, a tentative list of arms and equipment to be supplied Yugoslavia was prepared. Delivery of the items on this list is based on the fiscal years 1951, 1952 and 1953 appropriations. Arms and equipment included on this list are intended to replace the rapidly deteriorating materiel now in the Yugoslav armed forces, and to supply newly organized supporting units. However, no improvement can be expected in the capabilities of the

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armed forces until this equipment has been received, delivered to units, and the troops trained in its use and maintenance. Since the bulk of this equipment is not expected to arrive before mid-1952 no improvement can be expected before the end of 1952 or mid 1953.

1. Concurrent with the supply of Western military aid, the Yugoslav General Staff sections must reorganize and improve their tactics and techniques. This is particularly true of their staff planning and coordination agencies. Without drastic improvements along this line much, if not all, of the equipment supplied would be ineffective or lost in the early stages of a major attack against the country.

C. Marshal Tito on more than one occasion has stated his belief that a Satellite-Soviet attack on Yugoslavia would actively involve the West, not because of "sufficiently close" Western-Yugoslav relations but because of the impossibility of localizing such a conflict. In a widely publicized foreign policy speech, Tito said "a localized war in Europe is most unlikely." In August Tito stated in conversations with Senator Moody and other United States officials, that recent history proves this type of conflict (Yugoslav/Satellite war) is difficult, in fact almost impossible, to localize.

1. Tito and other top Yugoslav officials have implied frequently that they expect rapid assistance from the West if attacked. For example, Yugoslav Delegate to the United Nations Alex Bebler, expressed the belief that potentialities for defense of Yugoslavia are favorable, provided assistance was received from other members of the United Nations. A guarantee of Western intervention in the event of attack would be welcomed by Yugoslavia, as a deterrent to potential aggression, but there is evidence that the Yugoslavs, even without such a "guarantee", expect eventual Western intervention in any conflict involving their country.

a. Tito, in a talk with Mr. Averill Harriman, stated that Korea might have proved to be a decisive lesson to the Kremlin

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when virtually all the members of the United Nations joined forces to meet the attack. Tito, on this occasion, again stressed that a war against Yugoslavia could not be localized.

b. In an interview with Marguerite Higgins at Brdo, in September, Tito declared that it was a misconception to think that the "Western powers might remain aloof in the event of satellite attack." He stated further, that "none of the Western nations, including England or America would want or permit our country to be abandoned."

IV. IS THE TITO REGIME THREATENED BY INTERNAL INSTABILITY?

A. (No Defense contribution)

B. What is the degree of Reliability of the Armed Forces?

1. As long as Tito is able to maintain an effective internal security force he can be assured of loyalty from his armed forces. There is recent evidence that Cominformism has penetrated the armed forces, but not to an extent which would cause concern. Several officers, who held minor commands have been arrested and tried for pro-cominform activities within the past six months.

2. Among the officers, especially those of high rank, there are three factors which must be considered in assessing their reliability; (1) the element of pro-cominformists; (2) those who are opportunists, who would be either pro-Tito or anti-Tito; and (3) officers, although loyal, who are not yet oriented toward the new policy of active cooperation with the West. In the event of a Soviet or Soviet inspired invasion of Yugoslavia the latter group would undoubtedly present a problem to the regime. This group would continue to show hesitancy in placing nationalism above Communism. The regime has recently increased its efforts towards a more effective political indoctrination of this group.

3. Among the enlisted personnel of the armed forces the strength lies in almost fanatical nationalism and in courage bordering on fool-hardiness which it inspires. However, there is much disillusionment

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with the present regime, which no amount of political indoctrination can remove. The recent increased discontent among the peasant population, due to the vagueness of some of the agricultural legislation and efforts by local Communist officials to circumvent the Government's promise to release peasants from cooperatives, is shared by many of the youth of military age. Approximately three-fourths of the armed forces is conscripted from the peasant population. The 1931 class now being prepared to enter the armed forces can be expected to carry with them this discontent.

4. Compulsory pre-military service and military service in Yugoslavia is very unpopular with the youth. Pre-military service has been on the verge of collapse for some time due to the lack of interest and attendance by both the instructors and participants.

V. WHAT ARE PROBABLE SOVIET/SATELLITE INTENTIONS TOWARD YUGOSLAVIA?

A. What is the probable Soviet estimate of the likelihood of the overthrow of the Tito regime by internal forces, whether pro-Cominform or non-Communist?

1. A survey of U.S.S.R. broadcasts since May 1951 shows that despite continued heavy attention by Satellite transmitters to claims of popular resistance to Titoist military preparations, Radio Moscow has given the subject only nominal attention in recent weeks. Anti-Tito propaganda in broadcasts to non-Yugoslav audiences reached an all-time high during August 1951. Although there is increased discussion of Titoist military preparations, over-all attention to Yugoslav aggression continues to fluctuate within normal limits.

2. Based upon the various propaganda themes which have received attention in Cominform propaganda since May 1951, it is logical to believe that the Soviets consider the overthrow of the Tito regime by internal forces as a definite possibility. No doubt agents are being introduced into Yugoslavia to agitate for this purpose. However, since internal

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security in Yugoslavia is considered very effective and no organized resistance groups are known to exist in Yugoslavia, it is doubtful that the Tito regime could be overthrown by internal forces until his control of internal security breaks down.

B. What is the probable Soviet estimate of Satellite effectiveness in an attack on Yugoslavia?

1. Since the rate of development of the Satellite Armies varies in each Satellite, the Soviet estimate of effectiveness of the separate armies must vary considerably.
2. It is doubted that the Soviets would order the Satellites to attack Yugoslavia unless the probable outcome was overwhelmingly in favor of the Satellites and a short campaign could be assured.
3. The armed forces of the adjacent Satellites with Soviet logistic support could defeat Yugoslavia; i.e., formal resistance could be overcome and the Yugoslav forces reduced to guerrilla warfare in the mountain redoubt area of Yugoslavia.
4. The assistance which could be provided by Satellites not adjacent to Yugoslavia would not materially change the outcome of an attack by the Satellites adjacent to Yugoslavia.
5. Any attack upon Yugoslavia must receive full logistical support from the U.S.S.R. in order to be effective. The employment of Soviet tactical forces would provide the strength necessary to completely defeat Yugoslavia unless adequate and prompt assistance in arms and equipment were received by Yugoslavia.

C. (No contribution)

D. What is the likelihood of a Soviet/Satellite attack on Yugoslavia prior to mid-1952? Has the possibility increased or decreased since preparation of Mid-29 and 29/1?

The conclusions contained in NIE 29 and 29/1 apply without change.

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